Arbeitspapier
Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance?
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 60
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Thema
-
contest
tournament
real-effort
experiment
contract theory
forward-looking
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Angelova, Vera
Giebe, Thomas
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Angelova, Vera
- Giebe, Thomas
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2017
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