Arbeitspapier

Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance?

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 60

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Subject
contest
tournament
real-effort
experiment
contract theory
forward-looking

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Angelova, Vera
Giebe, Thomas
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(where)
München und Berlin
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Angelova, Vera
  • Giebe, Thomas
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)