Arbeitspapier
Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance?
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 60
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
-
contest
tournament
real-effort
experiment
contract theory
forward-looking
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Angelova, Vera
Giebe, Thomas
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
-
München und Berlin
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Angelova, Vera
- Giebe, Thomas
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2017