Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies mechanism design under the level-k solution concept. The first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be level-k implementable. In some environments, this necessary condition is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compatibility, making level-k implementation more restrictive than Bayesian implementation. The second result shows that this is not a general implication. In the bilateral trade environment ex post efficient trade is always possible under level-k implementation. Further, ex post efficient trade is possible in a mechanism that is robust to different specifications of beliefs about the levels of reasoning of others and to any specification of beliefs about payoffs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2017-303

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kneeland, Terri
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157375
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ