Artikel

Public information: Relevance or salience?

How does salient public information affect voters' behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses - subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information's accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent - subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-28 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
committee decision making
information aggregation
recency bias
voting experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Invernizzi, Giovanna M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3390/g11010004
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Invernizzi, Giovanna M.
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2020

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