Artikel
Salience and strategy choice in 2 × 2 games
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's predictions correspond to those of Level-1 players in a cognitive hierarchy model. When it is the other player's payoffs that are salient, the predictions of the model correspond to those of traditional game theory. The model provides unique predictions for the entire class of 2 × 2 games. It identifies games where a Nash equilibrium will always occur, ones where it will never occur, and ones where it will occur only for certain payoff values. It also predicts the outcome of games for which there are no pure Nash equilibria. Experimental results supporting these predictions are presented.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 521-559 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
behavioral game theory
bounded rationality
salience
heuristics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Leland, Jonathan W.
Schneider, Mark
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g6040521
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Leland, Jonathan W.
- Schneider, Mark
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2015
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Community-based reasoning in games: Salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
Public information: Relevance or salience?
The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game
Behavioural isomorphism, cognitive economy and recursive thought in non-transitive game strategy
Computer solution to the game of pure strategy
Salience bias and overwork
Public choice
Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
Names for games: Locating 2 × 2 games
Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function
Introduction to the special issue political games: Strategy, persuasion, and learning
Behavioral game theory
Community-based reasoning in games: Salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
Public information: Relevance or salience?
The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game
Behavioural isomorphism, cognitive economy and recursive thought in non-transitive game strategy
Computer solution to the game of pure strategy
Salience bias and overwork
Public choice
Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
Names for games: Locating 2 × 2 games
Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function
Introduction to the special issue political games: Strategy, persuasion, and learning
Behavioral game theory
Community-based reasoning in games: Salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
Public information: Relevance or salience?
The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game
Behavioural isomorphism, cognitive economy and recursive thought in non-transitive game strategy
Computer solution to the game of pure strategy
Salience bias and overwork
Public choice
Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
Names for games: Locating 2 × 2 games
Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function
Introduction to the special issue political games: Strategy, persuasion, and learning