Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Voluntary industry standards: an experimental investigation of a Greek gift
One reason for firms to voluntarily increase their environmental or social production standards is to prevent consumers from lobbying for stricter mandatory standards. In this sense, voluntary overcompliance serves as a Greek gift, as consumers might be worse off in the end. Strategically, a Greek gift deteriorates the consumer's incentive for lobbying and, as such, might be unkind. In many experiments it was shown that unkind actions which decrease the other's payoff are punished by negative reciprocal behavior. This paper experimentally investigates whether negative reciprocity can also be observed if unkind behavior is not directed at payoffs but rather at a deterioration of strategic incentives. (author's abstract)
- Extent
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Seite(n): 29
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten (SP II 2015-206)
- Subject
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Soziologie, Anthropologie
Wirtschaftssoziologie
Experiment
Zielvereinbarung
Freiwilligkeit
Verbraucher
Reziprozität
Industrie
Standardisierung
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schmid, Julia
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (where)
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Deutschland, Berlin
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schmid, Julia
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2015