Arbeitspapier | Working paper

Voluntary industry standards: an experimental investigation of a Greek gift

One reason for firms to voluntarily increase their environmental or social production standards is to prevent consumers from lobbying for stricter mandatory standards. In this sense, voluntary overcompliance serves as a Greek gift, as consumers might be worse off in the end. Strategically, a Greek gift deteriorates the consumer's incentive for lobbying and, as such, might be unkind. In many experiments it was shown that unkind actions which decrease the other's payoff are punished by negative reciprocal behavior. This paper experimentally investigates whether negative reciprocity can also be observed if unkind behavior is not directed at payoffs but rather at a deterioration of strategic incentives. (author's abstract)

Extent
Seite(n): 29
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten (SP II 2015-206)

Subject
Soziologie, Anthropologie
Wirtschaftssoziologie
Experiment
Zielvereinbarung
Freiwilligkeit
Verbraucher
Reziprozität
Industrie
Standardisierung

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmid, Julia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
(where)
Deutschland, Berlin
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

Data provider

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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmid, Julia
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

  • 2015

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