A theory of school choice lotteries

Artikel

A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, one that is ordinally Pareto-dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms and one that satisfies ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 543-595 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Matching ; school choice ; deferred acceptance ; stability ; ordinal efficiency ; market design

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kesten, Onur ; Ünver, M. Utku
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2015

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1558
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150257
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET