Common enrollment in school choice

Artikel

Increasingly, more school districts across the US are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that, across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that, in general, participation by all schools may not be achievable because schools have incentives to stay out. This may explain why some districts have not managed to attain full participation. We also consider some specific settings where full participation can be achieved and propose two schemes that can be used by policymakers to achieve full participation in general settings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1237-1270 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: Common enrollment ; unified enrollment ; student welfare ; participation incentives ; school choice

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2631
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217074
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET