Arbeitspapier

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these conditions. We identify cases in which a sophisticated planner cognizant of these non-additive effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Incomplete Markets
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Public Goods
Thema
social preferences
implementation theory
incentive contracts
incomplete contracts
framing
motivational crowding out
ethical norms
constitutions
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Anreizvertrag
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Test
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bowles, Samuel
Hwang, Sung-Ha
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(wo)
Amherst, MA
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bowles, Samuel
  • Hwang, Sung-Ha
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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