Arbeitspapier
Efficient incentives with social preferences
This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.
- ISBN
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978-3-949224-01-0
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 180
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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mechanism design
social preferences
Bayesian implementation
participation constraints
participation stimulation
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Daske, Thomas
March, Christoph
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
- (wo)
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Bamberg
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Daske, Thomas
- March, Christoph
- Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
Entstanden
- 2022