Arbeitspapier

Efficient incentives with social preferences

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

ISBN
978-3-949224-01-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 180

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
mechanism design
social preferences
Bayesian implementation
participation constraints
participation stimulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Daske, Thomas
March, Christoph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
(wo)
Bamberg
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Daske, Thomas
  • March, Christoph
  • Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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