Efficient incentives with social preferences

Arbeitspapier

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-949224-01-0
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 180

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Externalities ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: mechanism design ; social preferences ; Bayesian implementation ; participation constraints ; participation stimulation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Daske, Thomas ; March, Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
• (where): Bamberg
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261339
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET