Arbeitspapier

Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation

This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent's action has persistent effects. We model general information environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. The martingale property of this performance metric captures the information benefit of deferral. Costs of deferral may result from both the agent's relative impatience as well as her consumption smoothing needs. If the relatively impatient agent is risk neutral, optimal contracts take a simple form in that they only reward maximal performance for at most two payout dates. If the agent is additionally risk-averse, optimal contracts stipulate rewards for a larger selection of dates and performance states: The performance hurdle to obtain the same level of compensation is increasing over time whereas the pay-performance sensitivity is declining.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 218

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Subject
compensation design
duration of pay
moral hazard
persistence
principal-agent models
informativeness principle

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hoffmann, Florian
Inderst, Roman
Opp, Marcus M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3232708
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-472016
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hoffmann, Florian
  • Inderst, Roman
  • Opp, Marcus M.
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe

Time of origin

  • 2018

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