Artikel
Collusion and delegation under information control
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the supervisor and agent may collude. I show that the principal optimally delegates the interaction with the agent to the supervisor if either the supervisor's budget is large or the value of production is small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently small and the value of production is high.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1547-1586 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Thema
-
Collusion
information design
delegation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asseyer, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3556
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Asseyer, Andreas
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2020
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