Arbeitspapier
Collusion under monitoring of sales
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms?prices are private information and their quantities are public information; an information structure consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric duopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized which does sustain collusion and it has the firm with sales exceeding its quota compensating the firm with sales below its quota. In practice, cartels have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 509
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Preisabsprache
Asymmetrische Information
Duopol
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Harrington, Joseph E.
Skrzypacz, Andrzej
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Baltimore, MD
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Harrington, Joseph E.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej
- The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2004
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