Artikel
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction property when message spaces are one-dimensional, and then show how to use additional dimensions to achieve dynamic stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 609-661 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Exchange and Production Economies
- Thema
-
Mechanism design
implementation
stability
learning
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Healy, Paul J.
Mathevet, Laurent
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE898
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Healy, Paul J.
- Mathevet, Laurent
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2012
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