Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Arbeitspapier

When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1001

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: game theory ; evolution ; learning ; adjustment dynamics ; dynamics ; dynamic stability ; strategic stability

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 1991

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221358
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ