Hochschulschrift
Three essays on worker turnover and incentive contracts in labour market search equilibrium
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2010
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
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Arbeitsmobilität
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitsmarkt
Matching
Arbeitsvertrag
Leistungsanreiz
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Anreiz
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie
Arbeitsmobilität
Stellensuche
Arbeitsmarkt
Matching
Arbeitsvertrag
Dienstvertrag
Arbeitsverhältnis
Anreizsystem
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Anreiz
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Matching ; Arbeitsmarkt ; Arbeitsmobilität ; Arbeitsmotivation ; Allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell
- Urheber
-
Zaharieva, Anna
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-124703
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.08.2025, 07:21 MESZ
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Zaharieva, Anna
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