Considerações sobre o método por exemplos de Ludwig Wittgenstein

Abstract: In his second philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a method by examples with intents of finally solving the philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, instead of searching for an essence that defines concepts, as Socrates demanded from his interlocutors, philosophers should show examples for concepts, thus responding to tradicional philosophical questions such as "What is knowledge?", "What is friendship?", "What is fair?". This article argues that Wittgenstein's method by examples could never solve for once philosophical problems, because people are different and, therefore, offer different examples for concepts, making it impossible to identify objectively the right and wrong examples. In addition, it analyses the fact that Wittgenstein disregarded such hindrance to the success of his method while formulating it. Furthermore, this work reiterates philosophers’ duty to search for the essence defining concepts

Object Details

• Alternative title: Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein's method by examples
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Portugiesisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion ; begutachtet (peer reviewed) ; In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia ; 20 (2020) 2 ; 140-153

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Philosophie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (who): SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
• (when): 2020
• Creator: Silva, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca

Further information

• DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v20i2.1774
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021092207570413719100
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:52 PM CET