Being Is a Being
Abstract: Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all.
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Being Is a Being ; volume:8 ; number:1 ; year:2025 ; extent:21
Open Philosophy ; 8, Heft 1 (2025) (gesamt 21)
- Creator
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Czerkawski, Maciej
- DOI
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10.1515/opphil-2024-0058
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2502070540386.981010705348
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:36 AM CEST
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Czerkawski, Maciej