Being Is a Being

Abstract: Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all.

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Being Is a Being ; volume:8 ; number:1 ; year:2025 ; extent:21
Open Philosophy ; 8, Heft 1 (2025) (gesamt 21)

Urheber
Czerkawski, Maciej

DOI
10.1515/opphil-2024-0058
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2502070540386.981010705348
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Czerkawski, Maciej

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