Being Is a Being
Abstract: Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all.
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Being Is a Being ; volume:8 ; number:1 ; year:2025 ; extent:21
Open Philosophy ; 8, Heft 1 (2025) (gesamt 21)
- Urheber
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Czerkawski, Maciej
- DOI
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10.1515/opphil-2024-0058
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2502070540386.981010705348
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ
Datenpartner
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Czerkawski, Maciej