Artikel

International treaties insufficiently curb global tax evasion

In recent years, the global community has promoted several initiatives aimed at breaking bank secrecy in tax havens. Such treaties for the exchange of information among tax offices can be effective. A treaty between country A and tax haven B reduces deposits from A in banks of B by approximately 30 percent. However, the analysis shows that tax evaders react to such treaties not by becoming honest taxpayers but rather by adapting their practice of tax evasion. Consequently, the international community must crack down on tax evasion more aggressively - for example, by disclosing the final beneficiaries of assets in tax havens or making it difficult for financial institutions in tax havens to access international capital markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: DIW Weekly Report ; ISSN: 2568-7697 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 42 ; Pages: 407-414 ; Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
Thema
tax evasion
international information exchange treaties
international bank deposits
tax havens

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Menkhoff, Lukas
Miethe, Jakob
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Menkhoff, Lukas
  • Miethe, Jakob
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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