Arbeitspapier
Competition in Taxes and IPR
We examine competition for foreign direct investment when governments compete in tax incentives along with intellectual property rights (IRPs) protection. Higher IPRs result in a lower probability of the multinational enterprise (MNE) being imitated and thus higher expected profits and tax revenues, all else equal. We show that, from the perspective of competing hosts, equilibrium IPRs are too high while taxes are too low. Coordination between jurisdictions can therefore lower the multinational's expected payoff, providing a rationale for why during recent trade negotiations FDI home countries complain about low IPRs in some locations while not pushing for them to be centrally determined.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP20/19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- Thema
-
Tax competition
FDI
IPRs
Imitation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Davies, Ronald B.
Han, Yutao
Hynes, Kate
Wang, Yong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University College Dublin, UCD Centre for Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Dublin
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Davies, Ronald B.
- Han, Yutao
- Hynes, Kate
- Wang, Yong
- University College Dublin, UCD Centre for Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2020
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