Arbeitspapier
Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects
Based on the critical assumption of strategic complementarity, this paper builds a general model to describe and solve the screening problem faced by the monopolist seller of a network good. By applying monotone comparative static tools, we demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and positive network effects leads to a strict downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities provided. We also show that the equilibrium allocation is an increasing function of the intensity of network effects, and that a discriminating monopoly may supply large quantities for all consumers than a competitive industry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2004/14
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Thema
-
network effects
strategic complementarities
contracting with externalities
second-degree discrimination
monotone comparative statics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Csorba, Gergely
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Csorba, Gergely
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2004
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