Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents’ preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 87.2007

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Thema: Many-to-one matching ; Hedonic ; Coalitions ; Stability ; Colleagues ; Matching ; Soziale Gruppe ; Koalition ; Arbeitsgruppe ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Revilla, Pablo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74255
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ