Arbeitspapier
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so as to minimise society's loss function. We find that the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is not necessarily characterised by substitutability. When uncertainty about the central bank's preferences is high, independence and conservatism can become complements. In this case, giving more independence to the central bank increases the need for conservatism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3344
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
central bank independence
conservatism
transparency
Geldpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Zentralbankautonomie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Staatliche Information
Ungleichgewichtstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
Zimmer, Blandine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Zimmer, Blandine
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Stable money and central bank independence: Implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany
Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany
Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty
Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions
Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Junckers Investitionsprogramm: EU-Kommission
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Stable money and central bank independence: Implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany
Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany
Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty
Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions
Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union
Junckers Investitionsprogramm: EU-Kommission
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Stable money and central bank independence: Implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany
Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany
Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty
Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions
Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions
Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Policy competition, imitation and coordination under uncertainty
Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union