Arbeitspapier

On the Choice of Royalty Rule to Cover Fixed Costs in Input Joint Ventures

In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether based on predicted or actual output), the downstream firms' perceived marginal costs are above the true marginal costs since fixed costs are incorporated. We find that tougher competition between the JV partners may actually increase channel profit under such a scheme. We also show that running royalties based on predicted output are outperformed by royalties based on actual output, but that lump-sum financing of the JV is preferable if the competitive pressure is weak.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4332

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Subject
input joint ventures
competition
royalty rules

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fjell, Kenneth
Foros, Oystein
Kind, Hans Jarle
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fjell, Kenneth
  • Foros, Oystein
  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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