Arbeitspapier
On the Choice of Royalty Rule to Cover Fixed Costs in Input Joint Ventures
In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether based on predicted or actual output), the downstream firms' perceived marginal costs are above the true marginal costs since fixed costs are incorporated. We find that tougher competition between the JV partners may actually increase channel profit under such a scheme. We also show that running royalties based on predicted output are outperformed by royalties based on actual output, but that lump-sum financing of the JV is preferable if the competitive pressure is weak.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4332
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
- Subject
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input joint ventures
competition
royalty rules
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fjell, Kenneth
Foros, Oystein
Kind, Hans Jarle
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fjell, Kenneth
- Foros, Oystein
- Kind, Hans Jarle
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2013