Arbeitspapier
Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization
Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs when both intra- and interbrand competition exist. Our findings contradict the common wisdom that fixed costs do not affect market outcomes.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-163-2
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 164
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Thema
-
Fixed Costs
Vertical Contracting
Monopolization
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Caprice, Stéphane
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
29.07.2028, 18:01 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Caprice, Stéphane
- von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2014
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