Arbeitspapier

R&D Networks

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-075/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
strategic alliances
networks
research and development
Industrieforschung
Unternehmenskooperation
Strategische Allianz
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goyal, Sanjeev
Moraga, Jose Luis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goyal, Sanjeev
  • Moraga, Jose Luis
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2000

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