R&D Networks

Arbeitspapier

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-075/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Subject: strategic alliances ; networks ; research and development ; Industrieforschung ; Unternehmenskooperation ; Strategische Allianz ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Goyal, Sanjeev ; Moraga, Jose Luis
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85753
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET