Arbeitspapier
Dynamic Farsighted Stability
We study farsighted stability under the assumption that coalitions may condition actions on the history of the play. vNM stable set over possible play paths is defined with respect to the indirect dominance relation. We show that such dynamic stable set always exists. It is characterized by a generalization of the ultimate uncovered set. In unbounded agenda setting context, the dynamic stable set implements only efficient outcomes if active coalitions form a majority.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion paper ; No. 22
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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vNM stable set
farsightedness
dynamic
agenda formation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Vartiainen, Hannu
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
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Turku
- (when)
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2007
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vartiainen, Hannu
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2007