Arbeitspapier

Dynamic Farsighted Stability

We study farsighted stability under the assumption that coalitions may condition actions on the history of the play. vNM stable set over possible play paths is defined with respect to the indirect dominance relation. We show that such dynamic stable set always exists. It is characterized by a generalization of the ultimate uncovered set. In unbounded agenda setting context, the dynamic stable set implements only efficient outcomes if active coalitions form a majority.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 22

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Subject
vNM stable set
farsightedness
dynamic
agenda formation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vartiainen, Hannu
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(where)
Turku
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Vartiainen, Hannu
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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