Matching politicians to committees

Arbeitspapier

I analyze the assignment mechanisms used by the political parties in the US Senate to match their members to legislative committees from a matching theory perspective: one-sided, many-to-many matching with existing tenants. Understanding the data-generating process through detailed analysis of committee assignment procedures is crucial, but under-appreciated in the literature. I find that Republicans and Democrats use two distinct matching mechanisms creating very different strategic incentives, and analyze the theoretical and empirical implications of these organizational procedures. First, foundational theories of committee assignments must be re-evaluated in light of the constraints and induced strategic considerations of the two mechanisms. Second, my findings inform how to parse data for well-grounded empirical analysis by exploiting marked differences in strategyproofness which these mechanisms induce, both across parties and across seniorities within party. Lastly, I derive testable predictions from matching theory and present suggestive empirical tests highlighting the strategic intricacies of the assignment process.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 088

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: matching ; legislative organization ; committee ; strategy proofness

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Thakur, Ashutosh
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (where): Bonn and Cologne
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237333
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET