Arbeitspapier
Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation
Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy to process. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumers than equivalent taxes on sellers because consumers underestimate the extent of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers' voting on tax regimes, and that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism in the experimental laboratory. Pre-vote deliberation makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct and does not eliminate the bias in the typical committee. Yet, if voters can discuss their experience with the tax regimes they are less likely to be biased.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2009-25
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
Tax salience
learning
deliberation
voting
Verbrauchsteuer
Steuertarif
Steuerinzidenz
Lernprozess
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sausgruber, Rupert
Tyran, Jean-Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
- (wo)
-
Innsbruck
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sausgruber, Rupert
- Tyran, Jean-Robert
- University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
Entstanden
- 2009
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