Arbeitspapier
Voting over tax schedules in the presence of tax avoidance
This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 529
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
- Thema
-
Tax avoidance
Majority voting
Order-restricted preferences
Single-crossing condition
Steuervermeidung
Wahlverhalten
Einkommensumverteilung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Roine, Jesper
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Roine, Jesper
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2003