Arbeitspapier

Voting over tax schedules in the presence of tax avoidance

This paper reconsiders the classical problem of majority voting over tax schedules, adding the possibility to avoid taxes. In this setting preferences over tax schedules are not determined by earned income, but rather by taxable income, which depends on the joint decisions of labor supply and tax avoidance investments. The ordering of earned- and taxable income are shown to be the same if the tax avoidance function is log concave.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 529

Classification
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Subject
Tax avoidance
Majority voting
Order-restricted preferences
Single-crossing condition
Steuervermeidung
Wahlverhalten
Einkommensumverteilung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Roine, Jesper
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Roine, Jesper
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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