Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting

Abstract: The author analyzes the optimal investment in environmental protection in a model of non-overlapping hyperbolically discounting agents. He shows that, in the long run and in the absence of a commitment device, society is stuck in a situation where all agents prefer further investments, yet no agent invests. This holds no matter whether agents are aware of the time inconsistency of their preferences. As a consequence, awareness of the time-inconsistency problem poses at best a short run remedy. Moreover, such an outcome may be Pareto inefficient and may explain the weak performance of long-run environmental policies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting ; volume:3 ; number:1 ; year:2009 ; extent:24 ; Economics / Journal articles. Journal articles ; 3, Heft 1 (2009) (gesamt 24)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Winkler, Ralph

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-12
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2412121813002.093250158075
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ