Arbeitspapier

Negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity

Heterogeneity is likely to be an important determinant of the shape of optimal tax schemes. This article addresses the issue in a model à la Mirrlees with a continuum of agents. The agents differ in their productivities and opportunity costs of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a unidimensional combination of their two characteristics. Conditions are given under which the standard result that marginal tax rates are everywhere non-negative holds. This is in particular the case when work opportunity costs are distributed independently of productivities. But one can also get negative marginal tax rates: economies where negative tax rates are optimal at the bottom of the income distribution are studied, and a numerical illustration is given, based on UK data.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. 09,12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Thema
optimal taxation
heterogeneity
welfare
Steuersystem
Negative Einkommensteuer
Arbeitsangebot
Arbeitsproduktivität
Opportunitätskosten
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
Großbritannien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Choné, Philippe
Laroque, Guy
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Choné, Philippe
  • Laroque, Guy
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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