Arbeitspapier

High marginal tax rates on the top 1%?

In this paper we argue that very high marginal labor income tax rates are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have preferences with high labor supply elasticity, make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. To make this point we construct a large scale Overlapping Generations Model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a wealth distribution that matches the data well, and then use it to characterize fiscal policies that achieve a desired degree of redistribution in society. We find that marginal tax rates on the top 1% of the earnings distribution of close to 90% are optimal. We document that this result is robust to plausible variation in the labor supply elasticity and holds regardless of whether social welfare is measured at the steady state only or includes transitional generations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 473

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Thema
Progressive Taxation
Top 1%
Social Insurance
Income Inequality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kindermann, Fabian
Krueger, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kindermann, Fabian
  • Krueger, Dirk
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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