Arbeitspapier

Understanding bank-run contagion

We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Importantly though, observed withdrawals affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thus contagious, only when depositors know that there are economic linkages between their bank and the observed bank.

ISBN
978-92-899-1119-1
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1711

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
bank runs
Contagion
systemic risk

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brown, Martin
Trautmann, Stefan T.
Vlahu, Razvan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brown, Martin
  • Trautmann, Stefan T.
  • Vlahu, Razvan
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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