Arbeitspapier

Money market funds intermediation, bank instability, and contagion

In recent years, U.S. banks have increasingly relied on deposits from financial intermediaries, especially money market funds (MMFs), which collect funds from large institutional investors and lend them to banks. In this paper, we show that intermediation through MMFs allows investors to limit their exposure to a given bank (i.e., reap gains from diversifi cation). However, since MMFs are themselves subject to runs from their own investors, a banking system intermediated through MMFs is more unstable than one in which investors interact directly with banks. A mechanism through which instability can arise in an MMF-intermediated financial system is the release of private information on bank assets, which is aggregated by MMFs and could lead them to withdraw en masse from a bank. In addition, we show that MMF intermediation can also be a channel of contagion among banking institutions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 599

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Thema
Money market funds
bank runs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cipriani, Marco
Martin, Antoine
Parigi, Bruno M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cipriani, Marco
  • Martin, Antoine
  • Parigi, Bruno M.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2013

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