Artikel
Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is privately known and evolves according to a Markov process. Under certain assumptions, patient players can attain approximately efficient payoffs in equilibrium. The public signal must satisfy a 'pairwise full rank' condition that is somewhat stronger than the monitoring condition required in the Folk Theorem proved by Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). Under stronger assumptions, the efficiency result partially extends to settings in which one player has private information that determines every player's payoff. The proof is partially constructive and uses an intuitive technique to mitigate the impact of private information on continuation payoffs.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 957-978 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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Repeated Bayesian games
efficiency
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Barron, Daniel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1934
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Barron, Daniel
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2017
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