The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 279

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
• Subject: Passive smoking ; regulation ; social norms ; evolutionary game theory.

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nyborg, Karine ; Rege, Mari
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192261
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET