Arbeitspapier

The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior

This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 279

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Consumer Economics: Theory
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Thema
Passive smoking
regulation
social norms
evolutionary game theory.

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nyborg, Karine
Rege, Mari
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Statistics Norway, Research Department
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nyborg, Karine
  • Rege, Mari
  • Statistics Norway, Research Department

Entstanden

  • 2000

Ähnliche Objekte (12)