Arbeitspapier
The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior
This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 279
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Consumer Economics: Theory
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- Thema
-
Passive smoking
regulation
social norms
evolutionary game theory.
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nyborg, Karine
Rege, Mari
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Statistics Norway, Research Department
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nyborg, Karine
- Rege, Mari
- Statistics Norway, Research Department
Entstanden
- 2000