Arbeitspapier

Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries' behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11956

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
embezzlement
dishonesty
guilt aversion
psychological game theory
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Attanasi, Giuseppe
Rimbaud, Claire
Villeval, Marie Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Attanasi, Giuseppe
  • Rimbaud, Claire
  • Villeval, Marie Claire
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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