Arbeitspapier
Trading networks with frictions
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stabity. In the presence of frictions, competitive equilibria might be neither stable nor (constrained) Pareto-efficient. In the absence of frictions, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are stable and in the core, even if utility is imperfectly transferable.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CERS-IE Working Papers ; No. CERS-IE WP - 2020/8
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
Exchange and Production Economies
Incomplete Markets
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- Thema
-
Trading networks
frictions
competitive equilibrium
matching with contracts
trail stabity
transaction taxes
commission
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fleiner, Tamás
Jagadeesan, Ravi
Jankó, Zsuzsanna
Teytelboym, Alexander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fleiner, Tamás
- Jagadeesan, Ravi
- Jankó, Zsuzsanna
- Teytelboym, Alexander
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Entstanden
- 2020