Arbeitspapier

Trading networks with frictions

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stabity. In the presence of frictions, competitive equilibria might be neither stable nor (constrained) Pareto-efficient. In the absence of frictions, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are stable and in the core, even if utility is imperfectly transferable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CERS-IE Working Papers ; No. CERS-IE WP - 2020/8

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
Exchange and Production Economies
Incomplete Markets
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Thema
Trading networks
frictions
competitive equilibrium
matching with contracts
trail stabity
transaction taxes
commission

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fleiner, Tamás
Jagadeesan, Ravi
Jankó, Zsuzsanna
Teytelboym, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fleiner, Tamás
  • Jagadeesan, Ravi
  • Jankó, Zsuzsanna
  • Teytelboym, Alexander
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Entstanden

  • 2020

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