Arbeitspapier
Informing Consumers about their own Preferences
We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits also those consumers who remain uninformed, as it reduces the firm's incentives to extract information rent. By reducing the costs of information acquisition or forcing firms to supply consumers with the respective information about past usage, policy can further improve welfare, as contracts become more efficient. The last observation stands in contrast to earlier findings by Crémer and Khalil (American Economic Review 1992), where all consumers are uninformed.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 12-7
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Thema
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Nonlinear pricing
price discrimination
monopolistic screening
information acquisition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Peitz, Martin
Inderst, Roman
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wann)
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2012
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-313251
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Peitz, Martin
- Inderst, Roman
- University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012