Arbeitspapier

Informing Consumers about their own Preferences

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits also those consumers who remain uninformed, as it reduces the firm's incentives to extract information rent. By reducing the costs of information acquisition or forcing firms to supply consumers with the respective information about past usage, policy can further improve welfare, as contracts become more efficient. The last observation stands in contrast to earlier findings by Crémer and Khalil (American Economic Review 1992), where all consumers are uninformed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 12-7

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
Nonlinear pricing
price discrimination
monopolistic screening
information acquisition

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Peitz, Martin
Inderst, Roman
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2012

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-313251
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Peitz, Martin
  • Inderst, Roman
  • University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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