Arbeitspapier

Regulating Innovative Activity: the Role of a Public Firm

Without spillovers and under the "winner-take-all" hypothesis, there is overinvestment in R&D in a non cooperative equilibrium. This is due to the so-called "common pool problem", i.e., duplication of efforts. We show that a public firm can represent a useful instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem. More precisely, it is provided that, in a mixed duopoly: (i) each firm invest less than in a private duopoly, (ii) although the expected time of innovation is postponed, social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 117

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
1991

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5247
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Delbono, Flavio
  • Denicolò, Vincenzo
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 1991

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