Management Control and Innovative Activity

Arbeitspapier

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 00-68

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Subject: Innovative Activity ; Managerial versus Owner-led Firms ; Incentives ; Tobit Regression ; Innovation ; Industrielle Forschung ; Investition ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Corporate Governance ; Schätzung ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Czarnitzki, Dirk ; Kraft, Kornelius
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24416
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET