College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Arbeitspapier

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges, and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) in which students can only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by the experimental data, yet we find a number of behavioral differences between the mechanisms that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2014-208

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Analysis of Education
• Thema: college admissions ; incomplete information ; student welfare ; contests ; all-pay auctions ; experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hafalir, Isa E. ; Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Kurino, Morimitsu
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103212
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ