Arbeitspapier

Peer settings induce cheating on task performance

Recent research has shown that the presence of peers can increase individual output both in the lab and the field. This paper tests for negative side effects of peer settings. We investigate whether peer settings are particularly prone to cheating even if they do not provide additional monetary benefits of cheating. Participants in our real effort experiment had the opportunity to cheat when declaring their output levels. Although cheating did not have different monetary consequences when working alone than when working in the presence of a peer, we find that cheating is a more severe problem in peer settings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 06/2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Demand and Supply of Labor: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Personnel Economics: General
Thema
cheating
peer effects
organizational design
personnel economics
experimental economics

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bäker, Agnes
Mechtel, Mario
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
(wo)
Trier
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bäker, Agnes
  • Mechtel, Mario
  • University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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