Arbeitspapier

Peer settings induce cheating on task performance

Recent research has shown that the presence of peers can increase individual output both in the lab and the field. This paper tests for negative side effects of peer settings. We investigate whether peer settings are particularly prone to cheating even if they do not provide additional monetary benefits of cheating. Participants in our real effort experiment had the opportunity to cheat when declaring their output levels. Although cheating did not have different monetary consequences when working alone than when working in the presence of a peer, we find that cheating is a more severe problem in peer settings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 06/2015

Classification
Wirtschaft
Demand and Supply of Labor: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Personnel Economics: General
Subject
cheating
peer effects
organizational design
personnel economics
experimental economics

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bäker, Agnes
Mechtel, Mario
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
(where)
Trier
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bäker, Agnes
  • Mechtel, Mario
  • University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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