On the supersingular GPST attack

Abstract: The main attack against static-key supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) is the Galbraith–Petit–Shani–Ti (GPST) attack, which also prevents the application of SIDH to other constructions such as non-interactive key-exchange. In this paper, we identify and study a specific assumption on which the GPST attack relies that does not necessarily hold in all circumstances. We show that in some circumstances the attack fails to recover part of the secret key. We also characterize the conditions necessary for the attack to fail and show that it rarely happens in real cases. We give a link with collisions in the Charles-Goren-Lauter (CGL) hash function.

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
On the supersingular GPST attack ; volume:16 ; number:1 ; year:2021 ; pages:14-19 ; extent:6
Journal of mathematical cryptology ; 16, Heft 1 (2021), 14-19 (gesamt 6)

Creator
Basso, Andrea
Pazuki, Fabien

DOI
10.1515/jmc-2021-0020
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022071914160906256606
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:36 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Basso, Andrea
  • Pazuki, Fabien

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